SUPPORTING INFORMATION FOR

“TRAITS AND STATES: INTEGRATING PERSONALITY AND AFFECT INTO A MODEL OF CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING”[[1]](#footnote-1)\*

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S.1. SCENARIOS

SUMMER HOLIDAY

*Imagine*: You are on holiday with friends at a sunny destination on the Mediterranean Sea and are greatly enjoying your stay there. Your new fancy camera was stolen when you were distracted upon arrival in your hotel, but you immediately reported the theft to the local authorities and sent the police report to your insurance company. The company let you know that theft is fully covered and immediately transferred the money to your bank account.

The friends with whom you are on holiday have decided to stay a week longer before returning home. You would very much like to stay too, but you financial situation doesn’t really allow it. Then, at the end of your holiday, your camera is returned to you by hotel staff. Even though you should report this to your insurance company and transfer the money back to them, you can stay a week longer on holiday if you don’t, since you would have enough money to cover the additional holiday expenses. If your insurance company detects fraud, this will lead to legal prosecution. You are faced with the choice to either report to your insurance company that you got your camera back and transfer the money you have received in compensation for the theft back to the company, or not to do so and stay on at your holiday destination for one more week.

DOWNLOADING

*Imagine*: You need a particular computer program for a personal project. The program costs about €100. You consider buying the program but you think you won’t be using it anymore after finishing the project, and therefore hesitate about buying it. A colleague has explained to you where and how you can easily, though illegally, download the program.

Imagine that there is a new government policy to clamp down on illegal downloading. According to this policy, internet providers have to track down illegally downloaded software through random sampling and report it to the authorities. This has already led to the prosecution of a significant number of individual users.

LEAK

*Imagine the following:* A part of your house needs a rather urgent paint job due to a leak. You have asked for various quotationsfrom different painting businesses and these turned out to be rather high; about twice your household’s monthly income. When you mentioned this to one of your colleagues recently, he told you about some experienced illegal Polish painters who would be able to do the work illegally for about half the money and offer the same quality as the regular Dutch painting businesses.

The Polish painters do not have a work permit in the Netherlands and the work would therefore have to be done illegally. Because part of the work has to be done on the outside of your house, it could be noticed. The labour inspection has recently announced that it will check more intensively for illegal labour with private individuals and the number of inspectors in your area has been increased. If the labour inspection ascertains that you have employed illegal workers, it leads to a fine, and taxes are added to the work.

In short, you face the choice to have the work done illegally by the Polish painters or legally by a Dutch firm.

**S.2. Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients and Significance Levels for Model in Figure 2 with Gender and Age Added as Control Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Estimates** | **Unstandardized**  **Coefficients (S.E.)** | | **Standardized**  **Coefficients** | ***p*** |
| Measurement Model | |  |  |  |
| Emotionality—emo1 | | 1.51 (.05) | 1.00 | .00 |
| Emotionality—emo2 | | 1.00 | .84 | .00 |
| Honesty-Humility—hones1 | | 1.15 (.08) | .90 | .00 |
| Honesty-Humility—hones2 | | 1.00 | .89 | .00 |
| Conscientiousness—consc1 | | .84 (.03) | .80 | .00 |
| Conscientiousness—consc2 | | 1.00 | 1.00 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect—nsa1 | | 1.00 | .98 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect—nsa2 | | .95 (.02) | .97 | .00 |
| Perceived Risk—pr1 | | 1.00 | .91 | .00 |
| Perceived Risk—pr2 | | 1.16 (.04) | .97 | .00 |
| Criminal Choice—CC1 | | 1.00 | .69 | .00 |
| Criminal Choice—CC2 | | 2.06 (.15) | .53 | .00 |
| Structural Model (Direct Effects) | |  |  |  |
| Emotionality → Negative State Affect | | .94 (.19) | .24 | .00 |
| Emotionality → Perceived Risk | | 3.17 (1.18) | .13 | .00 |
| Emotionality → Criminal Choice | | 1.69 (1.00) | .10 | .09 |
| Honesty-Humility → Negative State Affect | | .75 (.16) | .23 | .00 |
| Honesty-Humility → Perceived Risk | | 3.55 (.99) | .18 | .00 |
| Honesty-Humility → Criminal Choice | | –2.72 (.85) | –.19 | .00 |
| Conscientiousness → Perceived Risk | | 3.04 (.72) | .15 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect → Criminal Choice | | –2.92 (.33) | –.68 | .00 |
| Perceived Risk → Criminal Choice | | –.22 (.05) | –.31 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect → Perceived Risk | | 5.51 (.52) | .63 | .00 |
| Gender → Negative State Affect | | –.45 (.13) | –.16 | .00 |
| Gender → Perceived Risk | | –1.66 (.85) | –.10 | .05 |
| Gender → Criminal Choice | | –.83 (.71) | –.07 | .24 |
| Age → Negative State Affect | | .02 (.01) | .13 | .00 |
| Age → Perceived Risk | | .17 (.04) | .22 | .00 |
| Age → Criminal Choice | | –.06 (.03) | –.10 | .06 |
| Structural Model (Indirect Effects) | |  |  |  |
| Emotionality → Criminal Choice | | –3.44 (.76) | –.20 | .00 |
| Honesty-Humility → Criminal Choice | | –2.96 (.71) | –.21 | .00 |
| Conscientiousness → Criminal Choice | | –.67 (.26) | –.05 | .00 |
| Gender → Criminal Choice | | 1.68 (.53) | .14 | .00 |
| Age → Criminal Choice | | –.09 (.02) | –.15 | .00 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Structural Model (Total Effects) |  |  |  |
| Emotionality → Criminal Choice | –1.76 (1.29) | –.10 | .15 |
| Honesty-Humility → Criminal Choice | –5.67 (1.24) | –.40 | .00 |
| Conscientiousness → Criminal Choice | –.67 (.26) | –.05 | .00 |
| Gender → Criminal Choice | .85 (.88) | .07 | .38 |
| Age → Criminal Choice | –.15 (.04) | –.26 | .00 |

*NOTES*: χ2(d.f. = 56) = 131.76, *p* < .01; CFI = .93, GFI = .96, TLI = .89, and RMSEA = .05. In the SEM, covariances were added between gender and age and each of the exogenous variables, and paths were drawn from both age and gender to all three endogenous variables. *N* = 495.

*ABBREVIATIONS:* CFI = comparative fit index; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; SE = standard error; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index.

**S.3. Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients and Significance Levels for Model in Figure 3 with Gender and Age Added as Control Variables**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Estimates** | **Unstandardized**  **Coefficients (S.E.)** | | **Standardized**  **Coefficients** | ***p*** |
| Measurement Model | |  |  |  |
| Self-Control—HEXSC1 | | 1.29 (.13) | .98 | .00 |
| Self-Control—HEXSC2 | | 1.00 | .79 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect—nsa1 | | 1.00 | .97 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect—nsa2 | | .96 (.02) | .97 | .00 |
| Perceived Risk—pr1 | | 1.00 | .90 | .00 |
| Perceived Risk—pr2 | | .86 (.03) | .98 | .00 |
| Criminal Choice—CC1 | | 1.00 | .66 | .00 |
| Criminal Choice—CC2 | | 2.10 (.15) | .52 | .00 |
| Structural Model (Direct Effects) | |  |  |  |
| Self-Control → Negative State Affect | | 1.56 (.26) | .26 | .00 |
| Self-Control → Perceived Risk | | 8.84 (1.89) | .21 | .00 |
| Self-Control → Criminal Choice | | –4.47 (1.40) | –.17 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect → Criminal Choice | | –2.96 (.33) | –.69 | .00 |
| Perceived Risk → Criminal Choice | | –.17 (.05) | –.27 | .00 |
| Negative State Affect → Perceived Risk | | 7.71 (.67) | .63 | .00 |
| Gender → Negative State Affect | | –.72 (.11) | –.26 | .00 |
| Gender → Perceived Risk | | –3.14 (.84) | –.16 | .00 |
| Gender → Criminal Choice | | –1.38 (.62) | –.12 | .03 |
| Age → Negative State Affect | | .02 (.01) | .18 | .00 |
| Age → Perceived Risk | | .21 (.04) | .23 | .00 |
| Age → Criminal Choice | | –.08 (.03) | –.15 | .00 |
| Structural Model (Indirect Effects) | |  |  |  |
| Self-Control → Criminal Choice | | –6.08 (1.23) | –.24 | .00 |
| Gender → Criminal Choice | | 2.66 (.48) | .23 | .00 |
| Age → Criminal Choice | | –.10. (.02) | –.18 | .00 |
| Structural Model (Total Effect) | |  |  |  |
| Self-Control → Criminal Choice | | –10.55 (1.94) | –.41 | .00 |

*NOTES:* χ2(d.f. = 23) = 52.55, *p*<.01; CFI = .99, GFI = .98, TLI = .98, NFI = .98, and RMSEA = .05. In the SEM, covariances were added between gender and age and HEXACO Self-Control, and paths were drawn from both gender and age to all three endogenous variables. *N* = 495.

*ABBREVIATIONS:* CFI = comparative fit index; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; SE = standard error; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index.

1. \* Published in *Criminology*, volume 50, issue 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)